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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2) (h) (Supp. 1990).

NATURE

OF

PROCEEDING

This appeal is based upon an order entered by the
honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, Judge, Fourth Judicial
District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, dismissing
plaintiff/appellants complaint.

STATEMENT
I.

OF

THE

ISSUES

Whether plaintiffs/appellants have a recognizable

interest in defendant's/appellee's child to permit
intervention for adoption proceedings or grandparent
visitation rights.
I.

Whether defendant's child was at any time

parentless.

DETERMINATIVE

STATUTE

Utah Code Annotated §78-30-4(1)(2) (Set fort in its entirety
in the Addendum)

STATEMENT

OF

THE

CASE

On September 26, 1989, the appellee gave birth to a baby
girl.

(R. at 103). The father of the child is David V.

Kasper, son of plaintiff/appellants.

On June 17, 1989, David

V. Kasper, the father of the child, was killed in an
automobile accident.

David V. Kasper and appellee were not

married at the time of his death.

However, wedding

announcements were had been printed prior to David V.
Rasper's death.

On or about September 26, 1989, appellant

filed a complaint with the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Utah County, requesting grandparental rights.

(R. at 1 ) . On

September 27, 1989, appellee executed an affidavit and
release, relinquishing her child to L.D.S. Social Services, a
licensed child placement agency, for adoptive placement.

The

child has since been placed by L.D.S. Social Services in an
adoptive home.

(R. at 103)

Appellee filed a motion to

dismiss on or about October 10, 1989.

(R. at 6 ) . Both

parties submitted memoranda of points and authorities and
upon entertaining oral arguments, Judge Cullen Y. Christensen
took the matter under advisement and orally requested further
research and memoranda on the issue of whether or not the
subject child was ever "parentless."

(R. at 80). Having

considered the memoranda and matters outside the pleadings,
and pursuant to Rules 12(b) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Judge Christensen granted appellee's motion and
dismissed the case with prejudice on May 8, 1990, (R. at 106)
stating that the child was at no time parentless. (R. at
104).

The appellant's, Ruby L. Kasper and David Kasper,

appeal from the decision of the trial court.
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SUMMARY

OF

THE

ARGUMENT

The trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to
dismiss the complaint by basing its decision on one very
narrow issue:

whether the child was at any time parentless.

Plaintiff/appellant believes that the child was at one time
parentless.

Defendant gave up all rights, duties and

privileges to her child.

She signed an affidavit terminating

all of her rights and privileges for the said child and the
child was relinquished to a child placement agency.
When cafses such as the case at hand arise involving the
future of a child, the trial court should consider both
equity and points of law in making its decision.

In this

case, it appears that the Court did not take into
consideration one very important fact: that appellants are
the grandparents of the subject child.

This one important

fact guarantees appellant at the minimum an interest in the
custody and welfare of child or an inchoate right in the
custody and welfare of the child.

The trial court completely

ignored this right and interest that grandparents have and
dismissed the case.

This case should not have been dismissed

and appellant's should have been granted a hearing on their
fitness as potential adoptive parents.

DETAIL

OF

THE

ARGUMENT

Appellants believe that the trial court erred in
granting defendant's Motion to Dismiss the complaint.

The

Court failed to recognize the most important fact of the
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case, which is that the plaintiffs/appellants are the
grandparents of the subject child of this matter.
Appellant's believe that according to Utah statutes, case law
and since the trial court recognized that appellants are the
grandparents of the child, that appellants do have a right to
a hearing regarding their fitness as adoptive parents, or at
least whether they may exercise visitation rights with the
child.
A.

APPELLANTS SHOULD BE GRANTED THE RIGHT TO A
HEARING BASED ON UTAH CASE LAW AND THE
UNUSUAL FACTS IN THIS CASE.

According to the record in this case, the trial court
recognized that appellants are the,grandparents of the child
born to appellee.

However, the trial court failed to

recognize any right that appellants have regarding their
grandchild.

This is contrary to established Utah case law on

the issue of grandparental rights.

In Wilson v. Family

Services Div.r Region Two, 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976), the
Supreme Court stated that grandparents do have an interest
and a right in the custody and welfare of their grandchild
under certain circumstances.

Specifically, a grandparent has

a "dormant" or "inchoate right or interest" in the welfare or
custody of a child who becomes "parentless."

See also, State

In Interest of Tom, 556 P.2d 213 (Utah 1976); State in
Interest of Summers v, Wulffenstein, 571 p.2d 1319 (Utah
1977); K.O. v. Denison, 748 P.2d 588 (Utah App. 1988).
child is considered parentless then the grandparents may
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If a

exercise their right and assert their claim.

Wilson at 231.

However, contrary to Wilson,, the Trial Court stated that the
child was never parentless at any time and appellant's claim
was dismissed.
The Court's decision appears to be based solely on
Wilson.

In Wilson the mother of the subject child was before

the court on charges of neglect.
mother

During the proceedings, the

"agreed to surrender and disclaim all rights" to the

child.

The court did not terminate or sever the mother's

rights but father she
child.

voluntarxly

gave up her rights to the

The court then placed the child with Family Services

for adoption.

The mother's rights were never severed by the

court and the child was deemed by the Wilson court to be
parentless.

Appellants believe that Wilson is very similar

to the case at hand.

In Wilson and in this case, the rights

to the child were voluntarily terminated.

However, the trial

court in the instant action distinguishes this case from
Wilson.

The Court failed to give any reason or basis for its

decision of not deeming the child parentless other than the
Wilson case.

The appellants believe that since appellee gave

up all rights to the custody of the child by signing an
affidavit releasing her rights, that the child was in fact
parentless while it was in the custody of the child placing
agency.
By any definition of the word "parent", a child
placement agency could not be considered a

"parent."

An

agency's purpose is to place children with adoptive parents.
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In other words, the agency is to find suitable adoptive
parents for a child, not to be the parent itself.

The agency

is not a substitute, surrogate or any other artificial
parent, but is rather a weigh station between the time the
child is with its natural parent and the time the child is
placed with an adoptive parent.

This appears to be the case

whether the parents rights were voluntarily or involuntarily
terminated, and/or the agency is a private or state funded
agency.

In State In Interest of Summers v. Wulffenstein the

court referring to Wilson stated that "the administrative
agency should give serious consideration to the grandparent's
claim, and that failing, the court concerned with the welfare
of the child, should accord the grandparent a hearing and
determination on the merits of the petition."

State In

Interest of Summers v. Wulffenstein at 1322.
Appellants are sympathetic to the appellee's wishes to
forget a painful time in her life.

However, the thought of

losing their grandchild to an unknown couple and never being
a part of their grandchild's life is equally if not more
painful to them.

As much as appellee wishes to control the

future of her child, by law, the natural parent and the
agency have no legal right to grant custody,

id.

The

granting of custody is a judicial proceeding in which, if an
agency is involved, must consent to.

U.C.A. §78-30-4 (1) (2) .

It must be noted that once a child is placed with an agency
and the parents, if living, voluntarily release their rights
of custody and welfare in the child, then the parents are not
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required to consent to the adoption.

The decision of

choosing an adoptive family is then the responsibility of the
agency.

Appellants believe that the wishes of the natural

parent as to who the child is placed with are relevant only
to any relationship between the the agency and the natural
parent.

The wishes of the natural parent are irrelevant in

terms of the rights of others, specifically the grandparents,
and those who actually get custody of the child.

B.

WH^N A PARENT RELEASES CONTROL OF THE CHILD
TO AN ADOPTION AGENCY, THE PARENT LOSES ALL
OF HIS/HER RIGHTS IN THE CHILD

Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(1) states in relevant part:
A child cannot be adopted without the consent of each
living parent having rights in relation to said child,
except . . . whenever it shall appear that the parent or
parents whose consent would otherwise be required have
theretofore, in writing, released his or her or their
control, custody, and all parental rights and interests
in such child to any agency licensed or authorized by
statute to receive children for placement or adoption in
any state pursuant to that state's laws and said agency
has in turn, in writing, released its control and
custody of such child to any agency licensed under
Chapter 8a Title 55, or to any person, or persons,
selected by that agency licensed under Utah law, as
adoptive parents for said child, and such Utah agency
consents, in writing, to such adoption. (emphasis
added.)
Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(2) further states:
A minor parent shall have the power to consent to the
adoption of such parent's child, and a minor parent
shall have the power to release such parent's control or
custody of such parent's child to any agency licensed to
receive children for placement or adoption under Chapter
8 ["Chapter 8a1, Title 55, and, such a consent or release
so executed shall b e valid and have the same force and
effect as a consent or release executed by an adult
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parent. A minor parent, having so executed a release or
consent, cannot revoke the same upon such parent's
attaining the age of majority. (emphasis added.)
It appears from the language of the above statutes that
when a parent, whether a minor or not, releases the child for
adoption through an approved adoption agency, that parent's
control custody and rights to the child are terminated when
the parent releases the child and the agency accepts the
child to be placed for adoption, not when the child is
actually adopted.

Appellants believe that the adoption does

not have to take place for the parental rights of the
consenting parent to be terminated.

From the language of the

statute it appears that once the parent releases the child to
an agency the parent cannot revoke'the release and have the
child returned to him or her.

In other words, a voluntary

release of custody and parental rights has the same legal
effect as the court severing parental rights.

It is thereby

the duty of the agency to consent to the adoption, when the
adoption takes place, not the right or duty of the parents to
consent.

It is not disputed that appellee properly released

the child to a licensed child placing and adoption agency.
It is also not disputed that the said agency received and
consented to the release of the child.

Therefore, under Utah

Code Ann. §§ 78-30-4 (1), (2) it appears that appellee had
all rights terminated when she properly released the child to
the adoption agency and when the agency consented to the
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release.

This reasoning is consistent with Wilson and the

child should be deemed parentless.
Appellant therefore believes that the decision of the
trial court was arbitrary in that there is no rational basis
for the child being deemed parentless.

CONCLUSION

According to the above cited Utah Statutes, case law,
since appellants are in fact the grandparents of the child,
and appellants believe that the child was parentless,
appellants believe that they do have a right and interest in
the custody and welfare of the child.

Therefore, since they

timely intervened into the adoption proceedings, they should
be granted a hearing regarding their fitness as adoptive
parents.

DATED this

day of November, 1990.

Michael J. Petro
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Michael J. Petro, attorney for Appellee, hereby
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McConkie, KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN, 60 East South Temple,
Suite 1800, Salt Lake City, UT
DATED this

84111.

day of

, 1990.

MICHAEL J. PETRO
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing, postage prepaid, this
1990, to:

day of

David M. McConkie, KIRTON, McCONKIE

& POELMAN, 60 East South Temple, Suite 1800, Salt Lake City,
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ADDENDUM

11

78-30-3

JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Reviews. — Comment, The Utah
Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 319.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adoption
§ 10.
C.J.S. — 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 13.
Key Numbers. — Adoption «=» 4.

78-30-3. Adoption by married persons.
A married man, not lawfully separated from his wife, cannot adopt a child
without the consent of his wife, nor can a married woman, not thus separated
from her husband, adopt a child without his consent, if the spouse not consenting is capable of giving such consent.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 3; C.L.
1917, § 12; L. 1919, ch. 1, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 14-1-3.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adoption
§ 41.

C.J.S. — 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 14.
Key Numbers. — Adoption «=> 7.

78-30-4. Consent to adoption — Paternity claims.
(1) A child cannot be adopted without the consent of each living parent
having rights in relation to said child, except that consent is not necessary
from a father or mother who has been judicially deprived of the custody of the
child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion; provided, that the district
court may order the adoption of any child, without notice to or consent in court
of the parent or parents thereof, whenever it shall appear that the parent or
parents whose consent would otherwise be required have theretofore, in writing, acknowledged before any officer authorized to take acknowledgments,
released his or her or their control or custody of such child to any agency
licensed to receive children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8a, Title
55, and such agency consents, in writing, to such adoption or,whenever it
shall appear that the parent or parents whose consent would otherwise be
required have theretofore, in writing, released his or her or their control,
custody, and all parental rights and interests in such child to any agency
licensed or authorized by statute to receive children for placement or adoption
in any state pursuant to that state's laws and said agency has in turn, in
writing, released its control and custody of such child to any agency licensed
under Chapter 8a, Title 55, or to any person, or persons, selected by that
agency licensed under Utah law, as adoptive parents for said child, and such
Utah agency consents, in writing, to such adoption.
(2) A minor parent shall have the power to consent to the adoption of such
parent's child, and a minor parent shall have the power to release such parent's control or custody of such parent's child to any agency licensed to receive
children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8 [Chapter 8a], Title 55,
and, such a consent or release so executed shall be valid and have the same
force and effect as a consent or release executed by an adult parent. A minor
parent, having so executed a release or consent, cannot revoke the same upon
such parent's attaining the age of majority.
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